Abstract-We investigate the gaps for Soldiers in information collection and resource management for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). ISR comprises the intelligence functions supporting military operations; we concentrate on ISR for physical sensors (air and ground platforms). To identify gaps, we use approaches from Human Factors (interactions between humans and technical systems to optimize human and system performance) at the level of Soldier functions/activities in ISR. Key gaps (e.g., the loud auditory signatures of some air assets, unofficial ISR requests, and unintended battlefield effects) are identified. These gaps illustrate that ISR is not purely a technical problem. Instead, interactions between technical systems, humans, and the environment result in unpredictability and adaptability in using technical systems. To mitigate these gaps, we provide technology recommendations.
INTRODUCTION
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is the "…'hub' of 21 st Century (Military) Operations" [1] . ISR comprises the integrated intelligence functions supporting military operations [2] . The U.S. Army conceptualizes functions of the intelligence cycle as information: Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (CPED) [3] ; the U.K. military also conceptualizes an intelligence cycle similar to CPED. There are two distinct sources for information collection [4] :
1. Soft sources: Information from humans (e.g., human terrain mapping, an interview with a confidential informant, and social media). 2. Hard sources: Information from physical sensors (e.g., visible imagery captured by an unmanned aerial vehicle). This paper primarily focuses on hard sources of information.
The purpose of this research was to examine information collection and resource management of ISR assets (typically aerial assets but also ground assets) and the battlefield effects of ISR based on Soldier goals, constraints, and priorities. In addition, we provide technology recommendations for many of the identified gaps. Gaps were identified based on semistructured interviews with subject matter experts (U.S. Army Soldiers with ISR experience during deployment) using approaches from Human Factors. Human Factors 1 is defined as understanding the human interactions with systems (e.g., technical systems, communication with other humans) to optimize both human performance and overall system performance [7] , [8] . Human Factors is an integral part of the successful development and implementation of technology (i.e., supporting and enhancing human cognitive performance) because of the [8] , [9] :
1. Fundamental limits of human performance. 2. Large number of ways humans can interact or use (technical and other) systems in dynamic operational environments, neither of which may be anticipated without an understanding of goals, activities, and tasks.
ISR is not just a technical problem; humans must make decisions about information collection and resource management. Thus, ISR involves social, natural, and technical systems. Social and natural systems tend to be less predictable, but more adaptable, than engineered (technical) systems [10] . The different systems in ISR are:
1. In Section II, we cover past ISR work, which is mainly technology focused or an assessment from a military command perspective. In Section III, we discuss the study methodology, subject matter experts, and the procedure, followed by the gaps. In Section IV, to meet the identified gaps, we provide recommendations for developing and implementing technology. In Section V, we conclude the paper and discuss limitations and future directions.
II. PAST WORK
Past work in ISR is mainly technology focused or an assessment from a military command perspective. For longterm ISR technology, several roadmaps provide research and development plans for better sensors, improved sensor platforms, and new physical network capabilities [11] [12] [13] [14] . General near-term technology work seeks to address gaps in the management, processing, and fusion of heterogeneous (i.e., soft and hard) information to aid human decision-making [15] . Using a technical system optimization approach, multiple capability gaps have been conceptually identified [16] ; these gaps include the need for a common operating picture for assets, system interoperability, a system to determine asset suitability for collection requirements, and decision aids [16] .
Specific technology efforts for ISR concentrate on different computing and network architectures (e.g., scalability, security, and bandwidth) to exploit the vast and growing amounts of data [16] , [17] . There is also a broad research program on techniques for soft and hard information fusion [18] . The U.S. and U.K. International Technology Alliance in Network & Information Sciences is developing technology for coalition ISR allocation using controlled natural language [19] , such as the Sensor Assignments to Mission (SAM) system [20] , [21] . Last, comprehensive evaluations of tactical and operational gaps in ISR provide a military command and doctrinal perspective [22] , [23] .
III. HUMAN FACTORS: ISR GAPS
In this section, we discuss the study methodology, subject matter experts, and the procedure, followed by the gaps. To provide structure to the interview questions, we apply elements from two functional/goal-oriented Human Factors approaches [24] [25] [26] . The general aim was to understand, "Why is a user performing an activity, task, action, or operation in the first place?" [24, pp. 15] ; this approach is ActivityCentered Design [25] . A related approach, Work Domain Analysis, was also used to determine Soldier functions, goals, constraints, and priorities [26] . These approaches provided the overarching structure for interviews (see Table II ).
A. Subject Matter Experts
Fourteen U.S. Army Soldiers with ISR experience were interviewed. All Soldiers had deployed experience with ISR ranging from management, collection, and analysis duties in a Tactical Operations Center to first-hand tactical experience with tactical use of ISR and the direct effects of ISR on military operations. Subject matter experts consisted of 13 males and 1 female (mean age = 27.1 years old, age unknown for 4 participants). Characteristics of subject matter experts are described in Table I . 
B. Procedure
Subject matter experts were recruited at an Umbrella Week (this is a scheduled week where units set aside times for researchers to interview Soldiers and administer surveys) and by asking other researchers and Soldiers for suggested contacts. All Soldiers were told that participation was completely voluntary, they could withdraw at any time and for any reason, and responses were non-attributional. Subject matter experts received no compensation for their participation.
The first author conducted all interviews. Subject matter experts were told the purpose of the interview was to identify the tactical and operational gaps in ISR, based on their expertise and knowledge, with the end goal of improving the effectiveness of ISR. In addition, Soldiers were informed that their blunt, honest feedback would be appreciated. Some Soldiers (6 out of 14) completed a 15-minute ISR decisionmaking task before the interview. Results from this task are not discussed here. Examples of the standardized interview questions, for general Soldier functions, are shown in Table II . The example questions were always asked, but interviews were not limited to these questions. Follow-up questions were asked to obtain more detailed information and clarification. To verify understanding, every effort was made to ask openended as opposed to potentially leading or loaded questions. For security reasons, interview responses containing potentially sensitive information (e.g., tactics, techniques, and procedures or specific system capabilities) are either described generically or have been intentionally omitted at the discretion of the first author.
To save time and promote discussion among the Soldiers, a combination of interview formats were used:
1. Small group interviews: In groups of two, four, and four Soldiers. 2. Individual interviews with four Soldiers. Six Soldiers (four individual and a group of two) were interviewed over the phone, the remaining were interviewed in person. The group and individual interviews lasted from 20 minutes to 2.5 hours (mean duration = 70.3 minutes).
C. Gaps
The interviews produced nine general gaps. These gaps are presented in Table III (the numbers in parentheses denote the correspondence to interview questions in Table II). Following  Table III , gaps in software systems are discussed. 
ISR Software Systems
The general issue with ISR software systems was a lack of integration. Subject matter experts noted using two main software systems to manage ISR: Google Earth 2 and a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) system. Google Earth was used to perform the following functions:
1. Flight planning: Plan and share planned air ISR tracks. 2. Common Operating Picture: Real-time air ISR tracking, limited to specific air platforms and ones equipped with functioning trackers. 3. Sensor Feeds: View real-time feeds (when supported). The NATO system was Interim Geo-Spatial Intelligence Tool (IGeoSIT) [27] . IGeoSIT was used in similar ways to Google Earth and had many of the same limitations. In addition to software, white boards, magnetic boards, and paper were commonly used to manage air asset patrol schedules (i.e., the ISR synchronization matrix) and to keep track of the location of air assets.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
To mitigate the identified gaps, we provide recommendations for developing and implementing technology. Specific recommendations are provided for some of the gaps highlighted above. In unpredictable, dynamic work domains (such as ISR), we contend that enhancing human performance requires technical systems that are adaptive, interactive, integrated (as few unique systems as possible), and transparent (see [10] , [28] ). Decision aids may enhance Soldier decision-making for ISR allocation and resource management, but new technical capabilities need to also be flexible (e.g., ad-hoc and unofficial ISR requests). Although we were unable to provide recommendations for all of the gaps, we hope our list will be a helpful guide for others.
A. Common Operating Picture for Air and Ground Assets
Existing systems do not provide a comprehensive Common Operating Picture. Unit location is not necessarily predictable and for ISR, is an important part of management and allocation (e.g., distance to the target or area of interest). A dynamic, integrated Common Operating Picture would increase Soldier awareness of available ISR resources and help keep "options available" as opposed to committing to an irreversible course of action. The issue of limited information on locations of ISR units between echelons and coalition partners is due to different systems, lack of interoperability, security, and possibly additional issues. Locations of ISR assets are often reported over the radio. One Soldier had an intriguing suggestion: using technology to process radio reports of unit locations to update asset location on digital maps.
B. Adapative Decision Aids
In the military domain, empirical research on cognitive performance with decision aids is rare. A notable exception is evidence for enhanced cognitive performance in Mission Command with specific decision aids [29] . In a similarly unpredictable and safety-critical domain, health care, the effectiveness of decision aids for clinician performance is mixed [30] . The mixed results in health care are partially attributed to mismatches between the often rigid implementation decision aids with unpredictable work processes [28] . Implementation of decision aids is a complex, multidimensional problem due to the variety of decision aids and their varying levels of automation [8] .
Nevertheless, decision aids may help mitigate ISR resource management and allocation challenges. In particular, it would be useful to provide Soldiers with ISR asset recommendations based on rationale for matching sensor and corresponding platform capabilities to different allocation tasks. Furthermore, decision aids may be expanded to assist with flight planning to help novice air asset operators perform like experts and to represent sensor capabilities (e.g., imagery, SIGINT) and the auditory signatures of air assets over different terrain, weather, and other environmental conditions.
The technological approach we are pursuing for decisionaiding is the SAM system [20] , [21] -an artificial intelligence (AI) system for ISR resource allocation. SAM uses a controlled natural language as a common human and machinereadable representation of knowledge, thus it is likely to have greater transparency to humans than black box AI. In addition, an interactive conversational interface for SAM is under development, allowing users to change and update ISR allocation tasks [31] . We plan to conduct behavioral research to assess and iteratively improve SAM for human cognitive performance (see [32] ).
C. Security
Partial automation of security may increase the speed, quantity, and critically the quality of information sharing. One approach that we are investigating is using controlled natural language to automate sharing ISR assets between coalition partners and echelons [33] ; this approach may also work for automation of information sharing policies. Soldiers reported that Palantir 3 (a software system for general intelligence analysis) has security and data-sharing policies, automating sharing of information, and intelligence products.
D. Other Gaps
Other gaps may also be addressed by ongoing technology efforts. The loud auditory signatures of air platforms may be partially mitigated by a combination of technological advances in design and acoustic modeling [34] . For example, this could be accomplished through integration of acoustic modeling to depict asset auditory signatures in flight planning software and real-time modeling during the operating of air platforms. Signal modeling could also be implemented as decision aids, recommendations to improve asset "coverage" (e.g., visible imagery, SIGINT). In addition, interoperability issues with configuration and alerts from ground sensors may be minimized with open architecture standards (e.g., Open Geospatial Consortium's Sensor Web Enablement Initiative 4 and Terra Harvest 5 ). Such standards may enable integration of disparate ISR sensor feeds into a single system.
E. Integration
We strongly recommend that novel technology is integrated into an existing Mission Command System instead of creating another new system. Unless a new Mission Command System is truly a usable "system of systems," the introduction of yet another system is likely to create more problems for Soldiers than will be solved. The sheer number of different Mission Command Systems is a general and growing problem for the military. In response to the question of developing new capabilities, nearly all Soldiers called for integration with existing systems. Poor system interoperability often means the same information must be manually re-entered or "fatfingered" into multiple systems. Stove-piping of systems is likely to result in data-entry errors and time delays in analyzing and disseminating intelligence. In a coalition context, the number of different systems is likely even greater, further exacerbating this problem.
V. CONCLUSION
We applied approaches from Human Factors to identify gaps in ISR and provided recommendations for technology. The wide range of the gaps indicates the scope of the challenges for implementing technology. This paper has strengths and weaknesses. The strengths are identifying gaps from the Soldier perspective, rather than only a technological one, and a relatively large number of subject matter experts compared to similar research. A weakness is the use of self-report, qualitative data from interviews. Stronger empirical inferences can be made from other research methods, such as observational data and objective, quantitative data (e.g., [35] ). Another weakness is the focus on breadth over depth. This is a general limitation of analysis at the more abstract, functional or activity, level compared to the specific lower level of tasks and cognitive task performance. Given the unpredictability and adaptability of Soldier activities in ISR, combined with its high dimensionality (system interactions), we assert that a broad understanding of problems is an informative starting point. Our work has high breadth, identifying general gaps in ISR, but limited detail for gaps.
Technology has enormous potential to enhance the effectiveness in ISR, but for technology to be effective it must provide solutions to actual Soldier needs. In future work, we plan to research human decision-making for ISR allocation with and without decision-aids using SAM. Results from future work may help iteratively refine the capabilities of technical systems, enhancing human performance.
